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Abstract:
In a game of incomplete information, an infinite state space can create prob-
lems. When the space is uncountably large, the strategy spaces of the players
may be unwieldly, resulting in a lack of measurable equilibria. When the
knowledge of a player allows for an infinite number of possibilities, without
conditions on the behavior of the other players, that player may be unable
to evaluate and compare the payoff consequences of her actions. We argue
that local finiteness is an important and desirable property, namely that at
every point in the state space every player knows that only a finite number
of points are possible. Local finiteness implies a kind of common knowledge
of a countable number of points. Unfortunately its relationship to other
forms of common knowledge is complex. In the context of the multi-agent
propositional calculus, if the set of formulas held in common knowledge is
generated by a finite set of formulas but a finite structure is not determined
then there are uncountably many locally finite structures sharing this same
set of formulas in common knowledge and likewise uncountably many with
uncountable size. This differs radically from the infinite generation of formu-
las in common knowledge, and we show some examples of this. One corollary
is that if there are infinitely many distinct points but a uniform bound on
the number of points any player knows is possible then the set of formulas
in common knowledge cannot be finitely generated.
Key words: Bayesian Games, Cantor Sets, Baire Category, Modal Logic,
Common Knowledge
1 Introduction
1.1 The problem with infinity
We want to understand infinite games of incomplete information whose lack
of finiteness lies not in the infinite repetition of stages nor in the number of
actions of the players but rather in the infinite structure of the information.
We assume that nature chooses a point in a state space and then the players
are informed partially of nature’s choice, either through partitions of the
state space or sigma algebras associated to the various players. If the state
space is finite, we remain in the context of a finite game tree, for which
Nash’s Theorem shows that there are mixed equilibria. The size of the game
tree may grow exponentially in the size of the state space, nevertheless it
remains finite and subject to the fixed point theorems underlying the Nash
Theorem. With an appropriate topology, one can approximate infinite state
spaces with finite state spaces. But how do the equilibria of the approximate
finite state space games relate to the equilibria of the original game, if indeed
there are any?
The space of all functions from the continuum to a set of only two elements
is extremely wild, indeed it is equivalent to the set of all subsets of the
continuum, a set of higher cardinality than the continuum. Since the integral
of an arbitrary function from [0, 1] to [0, 1] is not well defined, even with one
player and an arbitrary strategy we could have trouble defining a payoff.
The measurability of the strategies is an essential issue. But once we require
that the strategies of the players are measurable in some sense, the existence
of an equilibrium in measurable strategies is called into question. For fixed
point theorems to work for non-zero-sum games, usually we need that the
strategy spaces are compact and convex and that there is continuity from
the strategies to the resulting payoffs. By defining the topology weakly we
can get compactness of the strategy spaces, however continuity to the payoffs
may fail. By defining the topology strongly we can accomplish the continuity
to the payoffs but the compactness of the strategy spaces may fail.
Roughly this is the background to the non-zero-sum example presented by
this author (Simon 2003), for which equilibria do exist but none of which
are measurable. This example demonstrates that approximating by finite
state spaces teaches us very little about the original game. In this example
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a strong locally finite property holds and local finiteness guarantees that
some non-measurable equilibria do exist (Proposition 1, Simon 2003). This
focusses attention onto the local finiteness property as an important condition
sufficient for the existence of equilibria.
It should be noted however that with zero-sum games of incomplete infor-
mation the situation is quite different. A weak form of continuity, separable
continuity, combined with strategic compactness suffices for the existence of
a value and optimal measurable strategies, proven by Mertens, Sorin and
Zamir (1994) with the help of Sion’s Theorem (Sion 1958).
Next we describe our main results, followed by how they are related to games
of incomplete information.
1.2 Logic and semantic models
Strictly speaking, our main results pertain to modal logic. This perspective
introduces indirectly a more topological approach. Its basic structure is that
of knowledge without any probability attached, however it can be related
closely to probability theory and games of incomplete information, as we will
see later.
Let X be a set of primitive propositions, and let J be a set of agents. Al-
though it is legitimate to consider the case of either X or J infinite, for this
paper we will assume throughout that both X and J are finite. Construct
the set L(X, J) of formulas using the sets X and J in the following way:
1) If x ∈ X then x ∈ L(X, J),
2) If g ∈ L(X, J) then (¬g) ∈ L(X, J),
3) If g, h ∈ L(X, J) then (g ∧ h) ∈ L(X, J),
4) If g ∈ L(X, J) then kjg ∈ L(X, J) for every j ∈ J ,
5) Only formulas constructed through application of the above four rules are
members of L(X, J).
We write simply L if there is no ambiguity. ¬f stands for the negation of f ,
f ∧ g stands for both f and g. f ∨ g stands for either f or g (inclusive) and
f → g stands for ¬f ∧ g.
The connection to games of incomplete information is that an x ∈ X could
represent a fact about the game, for example the validity of a payoff matrix,
the hand that a player holds in a game of cards, or the probability with which
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a player believes something.
The relationship between multi-agent logic and games of incomplete informa-
tion is mediated by semantic models called Kripke Structures. There are sev-
eral ways to define Kripke structures, but for our purposes we present the par-
tition model (otherwise known as that corresponding to the S5 logic, which
will be explained later). A Kripke structure K = (S,X, J, (Pj | j ∈ J), ψ) is
defined by two sets S and X , a set N of agents, a collection (Pn | n ∈ N) of
partitions of S and a function ψ : S → {0, 1}X. The agent n can distinguish
between two points in S if and only if they belong to different members of
the partition Pn. The statement ψ(s)x = 0 means that x is not true at s and
ψ(s)x = 1 means that x is true at s.
We extend the function ψ by defining a map αK from L(X, J) to 2S, the
subsets of S, inductively on the structure of the formulas, the set αK(f) is
where the formula f is valid:
Case 1 f = x ∈ X: αK(x) := {s ∈ S | ψx(s) = 1}.
Case 2 f = ¬g: αK(f) := S\αK(g),
Case 3 f = g ∧ h: αK(f) := αK(g) ∩ αK(h),
Case 4 f = kj(g): α
K(f) := {s | s ∈ P ∈ Pj ⇒ P ⊆ αK(g)}.
A cell of a Kripke Structure is a member of the meet partition ∧ni=1P
i, or
equivalently a minimal set C such that for all j the properties P ∈ Pj and
P∩C 6= ∅ imply that P ⊆ C. A member of Pj for some j is called a possibility
set. A cell has finite fanout if at every point in the cell and every agent j the
possibility set of Pj containing the point has only finitely many elements.
Finite fanout is the logical equivalent of local finiteness. A formula f is held
in common knowledge at a point x of a Kripke structure if f is true at x and
kn1kn2 · · · knlf is true at x for every choice of a finite sequence n1, n2, . . . nl of
agents. A set of formulas in common knowledge is finitely generated if the
common knowledge of some finite subset implies the common knowledge of
the whole set.
Given a Kripke structure, construct a sequence R0,R1, . . . of partitions of S
by R0 = {ψ
−1(a) | a ∈ {0, 1}X} and x and y belong to the same member
of Ri if and only if x and y belong to the same member of Ri−1 and for
every person j the members Px and Py of P
j containing x and y respectively
intersect the same members of Ri−1. Let R∞ be the limit of the Ri, namely
x and y belong to the same member of R∞ if and only if x and y belong to
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the same member of Ri for every i.
For any set X and set J of persons there is a canonical Krike structure
Ω = Ω(X, J) defined by the formulas in L(X, J) such that from any Kripke
structure K (using the same X and n) there is a canonical map to Ω defined
by the map αK with the property that y and z are mapped to the same
point of Ω if and only if y and z share the same member of R∞. Any Kripke
structure with finite fanout will be mapped surjectively to a cell of Ω with
finite fanout, so that if R∞ separates all the points of a Kripke structure
with finite fanout then the structure is isomorphic to a cell of Ω.
Our main result is that for every finitely generated set of formulas that
can be known in common either this set determines uniquely a finite cell
of Ω or sharing this same set of formulas in common knowledge there are
uncountable many cells of Ω with finite fanout and also uncountably many
cells with infinitely many possibility sets of uncountable size. Furthermore,
if there is a uniform bound on the size of the possibility sets and the cell is
infinite then the formulas in common knowledge cannot be finitely generated.
The situation is very different, however, for sets of formulas held in common
knowledge that are not finitely generated – if there are uncountably many
corresponding cells then either none of these cells or all of them could have
finite fanout. And given that the set of formulas held in common knowledge
is not finitely generated and finite fanout doesn’t hold there may be a large
difference between the structure of the cells of Ω and the cells of some other
Kripke structure holding the same set of formulas in common knowledge.
Central to understanding our results is point-set topology. For every Kripke
Structure K = (S;X ;N ; (Pn | n ∈ N);ψ) we define a topology on the set S,
the same as in Samet (1990). Let {αK(f) | f ∈ L} be the base of open sets
of S. We call this the topology induced by the formulas. The topology of a
subset A of S will be the relative topology for which the open sets of A are
{A ∩ O | O is an open set of S}.
To some extent this paper follows results from two previous papers of this
author. In Simon (1999) we showed that for every set of formulas that can
be held in common knowledge either there were uncountably many cells of Ω
corresponding to those formulas or there was only one. The proof used Baire
Category in the following way: it was shown that a cell shares its formulas
in common knowledge with no other cell if and only if there is some point in
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the cell and a positive integer n such that the set of points that are reachable
in n steps from this point (using alternating possibility sets) is an open set
relative to the closure of the cell (meaning that it is not meagre in its closure).
A cell that shares its formulas in common knowledge with no other cell is
defined to be centered. In Simon (2001) we showed that if the set of formulas
held in common knowledge is finitely generated then the maximality of this
set of formulas is equivalent to the finiteness of the corresponding cell and is
equivalent to its being centered.
Given finite generation of the formulas in common knowledge, construct-
ing uncountably many cells with finite fanout is much more difficult than
constructing uncountably many cells of uncountable size. Even construct-
ing just one cell of finite fanout is difficult. To construct a cell of finite
fanout dense in Ω (meaning only the tautologies in common knowledge), we
spliced together an infinite sequence of finite Kripke structures (Simon 1999).
For each non-tautological formula that could be true was associated one of
these models and a point in that model where this formula was true. The
added connections to the other Kripke Structure were distant enough from
this point so that after the splicing each such formula was still true at its
corresponding point. To copy the same approach to construct just one cell
of finite fanout with a fixed formula f in common knowledge one must keep
this formula f true at all (rather than at just some) points after the new
connections are made.
There is an additional interest from logic to our main results. Finite fanout
characterizes the uniqueness of the extension of Ω(X,N) to the canonical
Kripke structures using ordinals beyond the first infinite ordinal ω (Fagin
1994). Our main results show that this property of unique extension has
little to do with the set of formulas held in common knowledge.
1.3 Local and global models
The example of Simon (2003) reveals that there are at least two levels on
which a game of incomplete information is played, calling for two models of
the game, a global model and a local model. It is with the local model that
local finiteness (equivalently finite fanout) is important.
The global model is that of measurability. There is a sigma algebra F on
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the state space Ω for which a probability measure µ is defined. For every
player i there is a corresponding set Ai of actions (either finite or infinite)
and for every choice of a ∈ A :=
∏
i∈N A
i and every player i ∈ N there is an
F measurable function f i(a) : Ω → R that represents the payoff to Player
i if the players choose the actions a at the point x ∈ Ω. Corresponding to
each player i is a sigma algebra Fi that is smaller than or equal to F (as a
collection of subsets of Ω) and represents the private information of Player i.
For each player i there is a probability distribution µi defined on F (which
may or may not be the same as µ). A strategy for Player i is a function σi
from Ω to the probability distributions of her actions that is measurable with
respect to Fi. Let Si stand for the set of all strategies for Player i and let
S =
∏
i∈N Si stand for the set of all strategy profiles, a choice of a strategy
for each player.
Given that A is finite, for any strategy profile σ = (σi | i ∈ N) ∈ S and
every player i ∈ N a corresponding payoff V i(σ) is defined as the integration
according to µi of f
i over Ω and the strategy profile σ. The strategy profile σ
is a Harsanyi equilibrium if for every alternative strategy profile σˆ and i ∈ N
V i(σ | σˆi) ≤ V i(σ)
where (σ | σˆi) is the strategy profile that is determined by σ for all players
other than i but determined by σˆi for the player i.
The local model starts from different assumptions, though both models may
have a synthesis. For every player i ∈ N there is a set Ti representing the
types of the player i. Let T :=
∏
i∈N Ti and for every t
i ∈ Ti define the cross
section Cti to be {t
i}×
∏
j 6=i Tj . For every t
i ∈ Ti there is a sigma algebra Fti
of subsets of Cti and a probability distribution µti on Cti that is defined on
Fti . As before A
i stands for the actions of player i (perhaps dependent on
the value of ti), and for every choice of a ∈ A :=
∏
i∈N A
i and every player
i ∈ N there is a payoff function f i(a) : T → R such that its restriction to
any Cti is Fti measurable. f
i(a) represents what Player i receives at any
x ∈ T if the players choose the actions a. A strategy for a player i ∈ N is
any function σi from Ti to the probability distributions on its actions, but
there may be no measurability requirements. A strategy profile σ is a choice
of a strategy for each player i.
In general, a strategy profile may not define expected payoffs for some fixed
ti ∈ Ti, as there may be problems of measurability. However if the actions are
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finite in number and for any fixed ti ∈ Ti the strategies of the other players
when restricted to Cti are measurable with respect to Fti then one can define
for each of her actions an expected payoff for Player i at the point ti ∈ Ti. A
strategy profile is a Bayesian equilibrium for a point t = (ti | i ∈ N) ∈ T if for
all i ∈ N the expected payoffs corresponding to the strategies of player i can
be evaluated in the corresponding cross section Cti and Player i cannot obtain
a higher payoff according to that evaluation by choosing a different strategy.
Notice that if the state space has the locally finite property and there are
finitely many actions then such local evaluations are not problematic even if
the strategies used by the other players are wild. As stated above, through
approximation by finite games local finiteness does imply the existence of a
Bayesian equilibrium (Proposition 1 of Simon 2003).
In some ways the global model is the stronger one. Under natural condi-
tions (such as a Polish state space) a global model induces a local model
through regular conditional probability distributions (conditional probabili-
ties for all the Borel sets done in a consistent manner, see Breiman 1992).
Likewise under natural conditions an equilibrium of the global model will
induce an equilibrium of the local model almost everywhere (see for example
Proposition 2 of Simon 2003, whose proof idea was explained to me by J.-F.
Mertens). However a lack of a global Harsanyi equilibrium in the presence
of local Bayesian equilibria shows that the local model has its advantages,
especially when combined with local finiteness.
Question 1: Let the player set N be finite, let there be finitely many stages
and on each stage each player has finitely many actions. Assume that the
state space T =
∏
i∈N Ti is compact and Polish with a Borel probability dis-
tribution µ. Assume that there is a uniform bound on the payoffs and for
every fixed collection of actions the payoffs to each player is a Borel measur-
able function on T . Is there such a game that lacks a Harsanyi equilibrium
and for every choice of regular conditional probability distributions for the
players there are no strategies that define a Bayesian equilibrium almost
everywhere?
1.4 Ergodic Games
It is worthwhile to look briefly at the structure behind the Simon (2003)
example. This example belongs to the category of ergodic games, which will
be defined below.
The Bernoulli space can be represented as the set {a, b}Z, where Z stands for
the integers (including the negative integers) and a and b are distinct symbols.
A point of {a, b}Z is a doubly infinite sequence x = (. . . , x−1, x0, x1, . . .) where
for every i ∈ Z xi is either a or b. The probability distribution on the state
space is the canonical one that gives every choice of a or b at any position
equal weight and independently of the choices for a or b at the other positions.
The function T : {a, b}Z → {0, 1}Z, called the shift operator, is defined by
T (x)i = xi−1.
In the Simon (2003) example there are two sets of payoff matrices corre-
sponding to a and b and the 0-coordinate of a point in Ω determines the
payoff matrices, so that if y ∈ Ω and y0 = a then payoffs at the point y
are determined by the matrices corresponding to a. There are three players,
Players One, Two, and Three. Let σ : Ω → Ω be the measure preserving
involution defined by (σ(y))i := y−i, where yi is the ith coordinate of y ∈ Ω.
σ is the reflection of the sequence about the position zero. Let τ : Ω→ Ω be
the measure preserving involution defined by (τ(y))i := y1−i. It follows that
T := τ ◦ σ is the usual Bernoulli shift operator (T (y))i = yi−1. Define the
beliefs t1, t2 and t3 of the players according to σ for Player One and τ for
the other players; this means that at any point y ∈ Ω Player One considers
only y and σ(y) to be possible, and with equal probability; (if σ(y) = y then
Player One believes in y with full probability). At any y, both Player Two
and Player Three believe that only y and τ(y) are possible, and with equal
probability. Player Two and Three have the same beliefs. Player One always
knows the payoff but not always what the other players might know.
The secret to this example is that the shift operator T is an ergodic operator
that acts almost everywhere upon any equilibrium of the game in a way so
that this equilibrium cannot be measurable.
The game example in Simon (2003) is also an ergodic game. An ergodic game
is a game satisfying the following properties:
(1) there is one stage of play with moves chosen simultaneously,
(2) there are finitely many players,
(3) each player has finitely many moves,
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(4) there is a compact Polish space Ω with an atomless Borel probability
distribution µ representing a choice by nature,
(5) for every combination of moves, one for each player, the payoff to each
player is a continuous function from Ω to R,
(6) at every point x ∈ Ω every player j has a discrete probability distribution
on Ω, called his belief, with a finite support set Sj(x) containing x such that
at all the other points in this finite support set Sj(x) the player j has the
same discrete distribution,
(7) these discrete beliefs of the players change continuously (with respect
to the weak∗ topology), and for any player j it forms a regular conditional
probability of µ with respect to the sigma algebra F j := {B | B is Borel and
x ∈ B ⇔ Sj(x) ⊆ B},
(8) If B is a Borel set with B ∈ F j for all players j then µ(B) is equal to
either zero or one.
By Property 6 all ergodic games have the local finiteness property.
A measure preserving transformation T on a probability space with a Borel
probability distribution µ is called ergodic if the only Borel sets B with
T−1(B) = B satisfy µ(B) = 0 or µ(B) = 1. Why is the term ergodic used
to describe these games? The ergodic aspect of these games is contained
in Property 8. It guarantees that the game cannot not decompose into two
different subgames of positive probability.
There is an easy way to create an ergodic game with n players. Let Ω be
a compact Polish probability space with a Borel probability measure µ. A
function f : S → S is called an involution if f is not the identity function
but f 2 is the identity function. Let σ1, σ2, . . . , σn be a set of n continuous
measure preserving involutions such that some combination of the σi’s is an
ergodic transformation. For each player i define Fi to be {B | B Borel , x ∈
B ⇒ σi(x) ∈ B} and Ti to be the equivalence classes defined by x ∼i y if
and only if x = y or y = σi(x). For every player i define the belief function
ti : Ω→ ∆(Ω) by
t(x)(B) =
0 if both x and σi(x) are not in B,
1 if both x and σi(x) are in B, and
1/2 otherwise.
9
ti is continuous with respect to the weak
∗ topology and the function t :
Ω→ ∆(Ω) is a regular conditional probability induced by µ and Fi (Lemma
0 of Simon 2003). The rest of the properties of an ergodic game can be
constructed easily. Indeed the same can be done for any collection of finite
groups (Gi | i ∈ N) that act measure preserving on a Polish probability
space. In this case at any point x the player i would consider the points of
the orbit Gix to be possible with each point y = gx weighted according to
the number of group elements g ∈ Gi satisfying gx = y.
1.5 Absolute Continuity
There is a condition on a game of incomplete information which, along with
natural assumptions on the payoffs, guarantees the existence of measurable
equilibria (as demonstrated by Milgrom and Weber 1985), absolute continu-
ity with respect to the marginals. With a weak topology on the strategies, it
implies continuity from a compact strategy space to the payoffs. It is worth-
while to see how this condition may fail, especially when local finiteness
holds.
If S = A × B and µ is a probability distribution on S then the marginal
probability distribution on A gives µ(C × B) to any measurable subset C
of A (and likewise define the marginal probability distribution on B). A
measure µ is absolutely continuous with respect to another measure m if
and only if m(A) = 0 implies that µ(A) = 0. One way for a measure µ to
be absolutely continuous with respect to another measure m is for µ(B) =∫
f(x)1Bd(m) for some non-negative and integrable function f . The Radon-
Nikodym Theorem states that in many common situations the converse holds,
namely that absolute continuity implies the existence of such a function.
A game of incomplete information with a probability measure µ on a state
space Ω =
∏
j∈N Tj (a synthesis of the global and local models) has the
absolutely continuous property if µ is absolutely continuous with respect to
the product of the marginals induced by µ on each of the Ti.
Notice that no ergodic game can have the absolute continuity property,
indeed neither can any game with the local finiteness property where the
Radon-Nikodym and Fubini theorems hold and every singleton set has zero
measure. It suffices to prove this for two players, as the proof for more play-
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ers introduces no new ideas. For each player i ∈ {1, 2} let µi be the marginal
distribution of µ on Ti. As any single point of Ω is given zero probability by
µ and every cross section of Ω defined by a point of Ti contains only finitely
many points it must hold that every single point of Ti is given zero probability
by µi. By Fubini’s Theorem we can re-write µ(Ω) =
∫
h(x1, x2) d(µ1×µ2) as∫
(
∫
h(x1, x2)dµ1(x1)) dµ2(x2), where h is the function implied by the Radon-
Nikodym Theorem. But for every fixed x2 ∈ T2 there are only finitely many
points x1 in T1 with (x1, x2) ∈ Ω. Because µ1 gives zero probability to ev-
ery single point it must follow that
∫
h(x1, x2)dµ1(x1) is zero for every fixed
choice of x2, hence µ(Ω) = 0, a contradiction.
Any game where two distinct players always share identical information and
the marginals are atomless will also fail the absolute continuity property,
because any set that projects canonically onto the diagonal of the product
of these two players’ type spaces will be a set of measure zero in the product
topology.
Consider also the following information structure on which a game can be
defined for which local finiteness holds but the absolute continuity property
fails. Let α be an irrational real number with 0 < α < 1 and let C be the
subset of the square [0, 1]× [0, 1] defined by C = {(x, x)}∪{(x, y) | y = x+α
or y = x+ α− 1}. Let µ be the probability measure on C defined by
(1) µ({(x, x) | x ∈ [a, b]}) = 1
2
(b− a),
(2) µ({(x, y) | y = x+ α or y = x+ α− 1, x ∈ [a, b]}) = 1
2
(b− a).
To make this example into a two-player game one can define payoff matrices
that change continuously according to the location on C. Due to the special
locations where the cross sections will be three points instead of the usual
two, strictly speaking such a game will not be ergodic. However by identifying
the values of 0 and 1 for both players an ergodic game can be constructed.
It would be interesting to discover whether a non-zero-sum game can be so
constructed where no measurable equilibria exists.
1.6 Finite additivity
One could think that the countably additive axiom of the conventional defini-
tion of a probability distribution is to blame for the discrepancy between local
and global equilibria, in particular the possibility of Bayesian local equilibria
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where there is no global Harsanyi equilibria. (It should be noticed, however,
that the proof that a global Harsanyi equilibrium induces a local Bayesian
equilibrium almost everywhere does use countable additivity.) Indeed on the
Bernoulli shift space if one required only finite additively there will be many
finitely additive shift-invariant measures that are defined on all subsets. This
is due to the fact that the shift transformation defines an amenable group
action. However with Gi subgroups defining the beliefs of the players (as
described above) generating a non-amenable group action there will be state
spaces for which there are no finitely additive measures defined on all the
subsets that are also invariant with regard to this group. If this groups acts
on any measurable equilibria in an appropriate way it may be possible to
demonstrate the non-existence of finitely additive global Harsanyi equilibria,
though there will be many local Bayesian equilibria.
In this context it may be relevant to review the related Banach-Tarsky Para-
dox from 1924, which speaks directly to the non-existence of finitely additive
measures defined on all subsets that are rotation invariant. The paradox
states that there is a way to partition the sphere S2 into finitely many parts
A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . , Bl such that after rotating these parts two copies of S
2
are created, one sphere from the A1, . . . , Ak and another sphere from the
B1, . . . , Bl. The group of rotations of S
2 is a non-amenable group. To review
the relations between amenability, the paradox, and other issues, see Wagon
(1985).
With inspiration from the Banach-Tarsky paradox and its relation to ergodic
games through amenability, we pose the following related open questions.
Question 2: Does there exist an ergodic game that has no equilibria mea-
surable with respect to any finitely additive probability measure of the state
space?
The analogy between Question 2 and the Banach-Tarsky paradox is the fol-
lowing. Assume the information structure of the ergodic game is generated
through finite groups representing the beliefs of the players as described
above. The subsets A1, . . . , Ak, B1, . . . , Bl, dependent on the strategies used,
could cover the state space and represent the locations where certain subsets
of strategies are used by the players. One would like to show that in any
Bayesian equilibrium there will be group elements acting on these sets in
a way similar to the rotations in the Banach-Tarsky paradox, demonstrat-
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ing that the equilibrium cannot be measurable with respect to any finitely
additive measure. There is a parallel in the main proof of Simon (2003),
where it is shown that if some player alternates her behavior throughout the
state space between two pure strategies and the measurable subsets A,B
represent the locations where these two pure strategies are used then the er-
godicity of the square T 2 of the shift operator T and the property T (A) = B
and T (B) = A almost everywhere implies that either both A and B are of
measure zero or both A and B are of measure one, both contradictions.
A question related indirectly to Question 2 is the following:
Question 3: Does there exist an ergodic game and some positive ǫ > 0
such that the game does not have a global Harsanyi ǫ-equilibrium in Borel
measurable strategies?
The example in Simon (2003) relies heavily on the non-linear aspects of how
the payoff can change when one player fixes her action and the other two play-
ers vary their mixed strategies. This inspires the following question, which
can be amended to refer to finite additivity and measurable ǫ-equilibria:
Question 4: Is there a two-person non-zero-sum ergodic game that has no
global Borel measurable equilibrium?
One could think that local finiteness is not appropriate for the context of
equilibrium existence, rather the locally countable property, namely that
every player at every point knows that one of countably many points are
possible. Indeed a countably additive measure on a countable set will be
determined by the weights given to all the individual points, and indeed
the proof of local Bayesian equilibria in Simon (2003) is extended to such a
context. But there are limitation to local countability that are not present
in local finiteness. For finitely additive measures there is no such unique
determination, as there can be many distinct finitely additive measures on
the same countable set that assign zero to all singleton sets. Furthermore
the infinity of any set introduces topological questions that do not arise with
finite sets, namely which sequences of points converge, and if so will this
convergence point be a member of that same set. This topological complexity
manifests itself further when we consider the logical aspects.
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1.7 Meagre and null sets
Although measure theory and Baire Category are distinct approachs, they
have many parallels. In most contexts a meagre or no-where dense set will
have zero measure, so that a first Baire Category set, the countable union of
meagre sets, will also have zero measure.
More parallels can be found when comparing Kripke structures to state spaces
of games of incomplete information. If C is a cell of Ω(X,N) then the formu-
las in common knowledge in C define the closure of the cell, parallel to the
definition of the support of a probability measure on a compact and separa-
ble probability space as the smallest closed set of probability one. Property
8 of ergodic games, that a set known in common by the players must be
either measure zero or measure one, finds its parallel in the Baire Category
argument underlying the centered vs uncentered distinction of the cells of
Ω(X,N).
It should be noted that it is easy to construct a probability distribution for
a Kripke structure, forming the basis of a game of incomplete information.
Consistent determinations of probabilities for all the formulas will induce a
Borel probability distribution by way of the Kolmogorov extension theorem
(where Borel refers to the topology defined by the formulas). Such consistent
determinations start with the probabilities for the validity of each of the
x ∈ X and then the probabilities that the players know or don’t know any
of the x ∈ X to be valid. Because this distribution will be unique on the
Borel sets, given that there is Hausdorff separation there will be no need to
consider anything but the Kripke structure’s canonical map into Ω, unless
one wishes to extend this measure beyond the (null set) completion of the
Borel sets relative to this probability measure. (Because the base of open sets
are defined by the formulas and they define both open and closed sets, any
topological separation of points will be Hausdorff.) Given that the topology
induced by the formulas is not Hausdorff (meaning that the map into Ω is
not injective), one could accomplish separation by introducing more elements
to the set X . In this context it may noticed that X can be extended to
a countable set without altering the Baire Category structure to the cells
(Simon 1999).
It is plausible, with a probability distribution constructed for a Kripke struc-
ture and the main results of this paper, that one could answer Question
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1 by demonstrating a game of incomplete information where there are no
measurable Harsanyi equilibria and Bayesian equilibria exist for only an un-
measurable subset or a subset of measure strictly less than one.
Going the other way, from either a local or global model for a game of
incomplete information to a corresponding Kripke structure, it is easy as
long as there are well defined supports for the local beliefs of the players
(defined directly or indirectly by the model).
For example, consider the Bernoulli shift space {a, b}Z where X = {a, b}
and a is true at ω ∈ {a, b}Z if and only if ω0 = a (and otherwise b is true),
and let the knowledge of Players One and Two be that as defined above by
the involutions in the example of Simon (2003), and for now we drop the
third player who has identical information to the second player. Because
the shift operator is related to the operations k1 and k2 on the formulas,
one can show easily that the Bernoulli shift space as a Kripke structure will
map isomorphically to a compact subset of Ω(X, {1, 2}) With probability
one, any point will be in a dense cell and due to local finiteness there must
be uncountably many dense cells. Because of some exceptional points in the
shift space, such as (. . . , a, a, a, . . .), there will be some cells that are not
dense. However by adding a new third player associated with the involution
π defined by π(z)i = zi if i 6= 0 and otherwise π switches the a with the b
and vice-versa on the 0-position, one gets a compact subset of Ω(X, {1, 2, 3})
that is comprised entirely of uncountably many dense cells.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background
information. Sections 3 and 4 contain the proofs of the two main claims,
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. The last section discusses the lack of finite
generation in more detail.
2 Background
2.1 Formulas and logic
Recall the above definition of the formulas L. There is a very elementary
logic defined on the formulas in L called S5. For a longer discussion of the S5
logic, see Cresswell and Hughes (1968); and for the multi-person variation,
see Halpern and Moses (1992) and also Bacharach, et al, (1997). Briefly, the
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S5 logic is defined by two rules of inference, modus ponens and necessitation,
and five types of axioms. Modus ponens means that if f is a theorem and
f → g is a theorem, then g is also a theorem. Necessitation means that if
f is a theorem then kjf is also a theorem for all j ∈ J . The axioms are the
following, for every f, g ∈ L(X, J) and j ∈ J :
1) all formulas resulting from theorems of the propositional calculus through
substitution,
2) (kjf ∧ kj(f → g))→ kjg,
3) kjf → f ,
4) kjf → kj(kjf),
5) ¬kjf → kj(¬kjf).
A set of formulas A ⊆ L(X, J) is called complete if for every formula f ∈
L(X, J) either f ∈ A or ¬f ∈ A. A set of formulas is called consistent if no
finite subset of this set leads to a logical contradiction, meaning a deduction
of f and ¬f for some formula f . We define
Ω(X, J) := {S ⊆ L(X, J) | S is complete and consistent}.
A tautology of L(X, J) is a formula that is true at every point of Ω(X, J), or
in other words a formula f is a tautology if and only if for every z ∈ Ω(X, J)
the formula f is in z.
The Ω(X, J) is itself a Kripke Structure (Ω(X, J);X ; J ; (Qj(X, J) | j ∈
J);ψ(X, J)) with for every j ∈ J the partition Qj(X, J) being that gen-
erated by the inverse images of the function βj : Ω(X, J) → 2L(X,J) defined
by
βj(z) := {f ∈ L(X, J) | kjf ∈ z},
the set of formulas known by person j and ψ defined by ψ
x
(z) = 1 if and
only if x ∈ z. Due to the fifth set of axioms βj(z) ⊆ βj(z′) implies that
βj(z) = βj(z′). We will write Ω, L, ψ and Qj if there is no ambiguity.
2.2 Common knowledge
The expression E(f) = E1(f) is defined to be ∧j∈Jkjf , E
0(f) := f , and for
i ≥ 1, Ei(f) := E(Ei−1(f)). A formula f ∈ L(X, J) is common knowledge
in a subset of formulas A ⊆ L(X, J) if Enf ∈ A for every n <∞.
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The set of formulas that are held in common knowledge is constant within
any cell and equal to all the formulas true everywhere in that cell (Halpern
and Moses 1992). In other words:
Lemma A: For any cell C of Ω(X, J) {f ∈ L(X, J) | f is common knowledge
in z for some z ∈ C} = {f ∈ L(X, J) | f is common knowledge in z for all
z ∈ C} = {f ∈ L(X, J) | f ∈ z for all z ∈ C}.
Due to Lemma A, we have a map F from the set Q = ∧j∈JQ
j of cells to
subsets of formulas defined by F (C) := {f | f is common knowledge in any
(equivalently all) members of C}.
For any subset of formulas T ⊆ L define Ck(T ) := {f ∈ L | there exists
an i < ∞ and a finite set T ′ ⊆ T with (∧t∈T ′E
i(t)) → f a tautology }. We
define T (X, J) = {Ck(T ) | T ⊆ L(X, J)}\ {L(X, J)}, and we say that T
generates Ck(T ). If there is no ambiguity, we can write simply T . Ck(T )
is the set of formulas whose common knowledge is implied by the common
knowledge of the formulas in T .
An S ∈ T is finitely generated if there exists a finite subset T ⊆ S such that
Ck(T ) = S. For every set of formulas T ⊆ L define the set
Ck(T ) := {z ∈ Ω | every member of T is common knowledge in z}.
For any T ⊆ L, Ck(T ) is a closed set, since the Ck(T ) is the intersection of
the sets α(Elf) for all l <∞ and all formulas f in T .
A cell C is defined to be centered if and only if there is no other cell C ′ with
F (C ′) = F (C).
In Simon (1999) we proved that if a cell C is not centered then there are
uncountably many other cells C ′ such that F (C ′) = F (C). Since Ck(T ) =
F (C) means that the cell C is dense in Ck(T ); the cell C being not centered
is equivalent to the existence of uncountably many other cells C ′ that are
also dense in Ck(F (C)) = Ck(T ).
In this paper we prove that if C is a cell and F (C) is finitely generated
then either C is finite and there is no other cell C ′ with F (C) = F (C ′) or
there is a continuum of distinct cells C ′ with continuum cardinality such that
F (C ′) = C and there is a continuum of distinct cells C ′ of finite fanout such
that F (C ′) = C.
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2.3 Kripke Structures
If K = (S;X ; J ; (Pj | j ∈ J);ψ) is a Kripke structure we define a map
φK : S → Ω(X, J) by
φK(s) := {f ∈ L(X, J) | s ∈ αK(f)},
where αK is the map defined above. This is the canonical map, also contained
in Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi (1991).
Theorem: For every f ∈ L(X, J), f is a theorem of the multi-agent S5 logic
if and only if f is a tautology. Furthermore, φΩ(z) = z for every z ∈ Ω.
For a proof of the first part of this theorem, see Halpern and Moses (1992)
and Cresswell and Hughes (1968), and for how the second part follows from
the first part see Aumann (1999). We will call this result the “Completeness
Theorem.”
For a Kripke Structure K = (S;X ; J ; (Pj | j ∈ J);ψ), if s ∈ αK(f), or
equivalently f ∈ φK(s), we say that f is true at s with respect to K. We
say that f is valid with respect to the Kripke Structure K if f is true at
s with respect to K for every s ∈ S. The Kripke Structure is connected
if the meet partition ∧j∈JP
j is a singleton (equal to {S}). We define a
connected component of a Kripke Structure to be a member of this meet
partition. Two points s, s′ ∈ S are adjacent if they share some member of Pj
for some j ∈ J . We define the adjacency distance between any two points s
and s′ in S as min {d | there is a sequence s = s0, . . . , sd = s
′, a function
a : {1, . . . , d} → J and sequence of sets D1 ∈ P
a(1), . . . , Dd ∈ P
a(d) such that
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d si and si−1 both belong to Di}, with zero distance between
any point and itself and infinite distance if there is no such sequence from s
to s′. Such a sequence we call an adjacency path.
Given a Kripke Structure K = (S;X ; J ; (Pj | j ∈ J);ψ) and a subset A ⊆ S,
we define another Kripke Structure VK(A) := (A;X ; J ; (Pj|A | j ∈ J));ψ|A)
where for all j ∈ J Pj |A := {F ∩ A | F ∩ A 6= ∅ and F ∈ P
j} and for all
x ∈ X and a ∈ A ψx|A(a) = ψ
x(a). If there is no ambiguity concerning the
initial model K, we can replace VK(A) by V(A).
Now we can see why a Kripke Structure with the finite fanout property is
essentially a cell with finite fanout. It is easy to prove that for every set
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P ∈ Pj corresponding to an agent j ∈ J in a Kripke Structure K that φK(P )
is a dense subset of some member of Qj (Lemma 5, Simon 1999). Fagin
(1994) proved that a cell has a unique extension to all canonical Kripke
Structure corresponding to the transfinite ordinal numbers beyond the first
infinite ordinal if and only if it is of finite fanout, and that representation in
all these canonical Kripke Structure characterizes the interactive knowledge
of the agents. Combining these results, restricting ourselves to Ω is sufficient
for understanding Kripke Structures with finite fanout.
2.4 Canonical Finite Models
Behind our main results is a hierarchical construction of Ω. Every formula
has a “depth”, an inductively defined natural number representing the extent
to which the knowledge operators kj of the agents j ∈ J have been used to
define the formula. (Formulas of depth zero are those of the conventional
propositional calculus, constructed without the knowledge operators of any
agents.) For every natural number i there is a finite Kripke Structure Ωi that
represents the knowledge of the agents up to the depth of i. Furthermore
Ω is the inverse limit of the Ωi, meaning that a point in Ω is defined by a
sequence of extensions from Ωi to Ωi+1 for all the i. If the set of formulas
held in common knowledge is finitely generated, then these formulas have a
maximal depth d. By exploiting the choices in how one could extend a point
in Ωi to Ωi+1 for some of the i that are greater than d, one can construct
cells in the limit of the process that do or do not have finite fanout. If
the corresponding set of formulas held in common knowledge is not finitely
generated, the lack of a maximal depth for a generating subset renders the
hierarchical construction meaningless for our purposes.
We define the depth of a formula inductively on the structure of the formulas.
If x ∈ X , then depth (x) := 0. If f = ¬g then depth (f) := depth (g); if
f = g ∧ h then depth (f):= max (depth (g) , depth (h)); and if f = kj(g)
then depth (f):= depth (g) +1.
For every 0 ≤ i <∞ we define Li := {f ∈ L | depth (f) ≤ i} and define Ωi to
be the set of maximally consistent subsets of Li. If there may be ambiguity,
we will write Ωi(X, J). We must perceive an Ωi in two ways, as a Kripke
Structure in its own right and as a canonical projective image of Ω inducing
a partition of Ω through inverse images. We define πi : Ω → Ωi to be the
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canonical projection πi(z) := z ∩ Li. Due to an application of Lindenbaum’s
Lemma, the maps πi are surjective. For all i ≥ k define the map π
i
k to be
πk ◦ π
−1
i . For any Kripke Structure K = (S;X ; J ; (P
j | j ∈ J);ψ) and i ≥ 0
we define φKi : S → Ωi(X, J) by φ
K
i (s) := φ
K(s) ∩ Li(X, J) = πi(φ
K(s)).
For every 0 ≤ i <∞ we consider the Kripke Structure Ωi = (Ωi;X ; J ; (F
j
i | j ∈
J);ψi), where ψi = ψ ◦ π
−1
i and for i > 0 the partition F
j
i of Ωi is in-
duced by the inverse images of the function βji : Ωi → 2
Li−1(X,J) defined by
βji (w) := {f ∈ Li−1(X, J) | kj(f) ∈ w}. We define F
j
0 = {Ω0} for every
j ∈ J .
Now we consider Ωi again as a canonical projective image. Gi is defined to be
the partition of Ω induced by the inverse images of πi, Gi := {π
−1
i (w) | w ∈
Ωi}. By the definition of Ω, the join partition ∨
∞
i=1Gi is the discrete partition
of Ω, meaning that it consists of singletons. Let F ji be the partition on Ω,
coarser than Gi, defined by F
j
i := {π
−1
i (B) | B ∈ F
j
i}. From the definitions
of the Ωi and the F
j
i it follows that ∨
∞
i=0F
j
i = Q
j.
Since X and J are finite, there are several important properties of the Kripke
Structure Ωi, all of which are used in this paper.
(i) Ωi is finite for every 0 ≤ i < ∞. (For a more general statement, see
Lismont and Mongin 1995.)
(ii) For every w ∈ Ωi we can define a formula f(w) of depth i or less such
that αΩi(f(w)) = {w}, meaning that the formula f(w) is true with respect
to Ωi only at w ∈ Ωi. This follows from the finiteness of Ωi. For any subset
A ⊆ Ωi define f(A) := ∨w∈Af(w), a formula that is true with respect to Ωi
only in the subset A.
(iii) It is easy to extend a member of Ωi to a member of Ωi+1. Fix 0 ≤ i <∞
and w ∈ Ωi. For every j ∈ J define F
j
i by w ∈ F
j
i ∈ F
j
i . If (M
j
i | j ∈ J) are
subsets of (F
j
i | j ∈ J), respectively, such that
1) w ∈M ji for every j ∈ J , and
2) for every B ∈ Gi−1 F
j
i ∩ πi(B) 6= ∅ implies that M
j
i ∩ πi(B) 6= ∅,
then there is a unique v ∈ Ωi+1 such that π
i+1
i (v) = w and for every u ∈ Ωi
¬kj¬f(u) ∈ v if and only if u ∈ M
j
i . Furthermore, this is the only way to
extend a member of Ωi to a member of Ωi+1; this is Lemma 4.2 of Fagin,
Halpern, and Vardi (1991). For any i ≥ 0 and v ∈ Ωk with k > i we define
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M ji (v) := {u ∈ Ωi | ¬kj¬f(u) ∈ v}. Notice that if w ∈ F ∈ F
j
i then M
j
i−1(w)
is equal to πii−1(F ), which could be a proper subset of the member of F
j
i−1
that contains πii−1(w).
(iv) For every formula f ∈ Li and l ≥ i π
−1
l (α
Ωl(f)) = αΩ(f). This follows
from (iii) and the Completeness Theorem. (See also Lemma 2.5 in Fagin,
Halpern, and Vardi 1991.)
(v) As a Kripke Structure, every Ωi is connected. This was proven first by
Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi (1991) and it can be proven in several ways (for
example from Proposition 1 of Simon, 1999).
2.5 The Common Knowledge of a Formula
Fagin, Halpern and Vardi (1991) investigated what happens when the agents
have common knowledge of a finite set of formulas, equivalently the common
knowledge of a single formula. Following their definition for “closed” and
not wanting to create confusion with topologically closed, for all i > 0 we
define a non-empty subset A ⊆ Ωi to be semantically closed (Simon 2001) if
for every j ∈ J , every B ∈ Gi−1 and every w ∈ A if π
−1
i (w) ⊆ F ∈ F
j
i and
F ∩B 6= ∅ then F ∩B ∩ π−1i (A) 6= ∅. Any non-empty subset of Ω0 is allowed
to be semantically closed. Let f ∈ L be a formula with d = depth (f). Fagin,
Halpern, and Vardi (1991) proved that Ck({f}) is not empty if and only if
the subset αΩd(f) is a semantically closed subset of Ωd and that there exists
a cell dense in Ck({f}) (equivalently Ck({f}) = F (C) for some cell C) if
and only if the Kripke Structure V(αΩd(f)) is connected. For all i ≥ d =
depth (f) we define Ωfi := πi(Ck({f})); it follows from property (iv) that
Ωfi ⊆ α
Ωi(Ei−d(f)). Define F
j
i (f) by F
j
i (f) := {F ∩Ω
f
i | F ∈ F
j
i}. Define the
Kripke Structure Ωfi = (Ω
f
i ; J ; (F
j
i (f) | j ∈ J);X ;ψi|f) where ψi|f refers to
the restriction of ψi to Ω
f
i . Likewise define F
j
i (f) by F
j
i (f) := {π
−1
i (F ) | F ∈
F
j
i (f)} and define Gi(f) by Gi(f) := {G ∈ Gi | G ⊆ α
Ω(Ei−d(f)). (where d is
the depth of f).
Most importantly, Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi (1991) showed how to create
extensions of Ωfi to Ω
f
i+1 for all i ≥ d = depth (f), with only an additional
requirement to the rules of (iii) governing extensions from Ωi to Ωi+1: We
must require that the F
j
i are in F
j
i (f), which means that the (M
j
i | j ∈
J) are also subsets of Ωfi . For the existence of such subsets is needed the
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semantically closed property. The ability to extend establishes the equality
Ωfi = α
Ωi(Ei−d(f)) for all i ≥ d = depth (f).
Fix w ∈ Ωfi with i ≥ d = depth (f) and with α
Ωd(f) semantically closed, and
let F
j
i be the member of F
j
i (f) containing w. The choice ofM
j
i (pi+1(w)) = F
j
i
for agent j was called the “least-information” extension in Fagin, Halpern,
and Vardi (1991). Define pfi+1(w) to be that unique member of Ω
f
i+1 such that
πi(p
f
i+1(w)) = w and M
j
i (pi+1(w)) = F
j
i for every j ∈ J . If f is a tautology,
then it was called the “no-information” extension, and in this case we write
pi+1 instead of p
f
i+1.
We define a formula f ∈ L(X, J) with d = depth (f) and |J | ≥ 2 to be gen-
erative if and only if αΩd(f) is semantically closed, V(αΩd(f)) is connected,
and there exists more than one cell dense in Ck({f}), (meaning that these
cells are uncentered). In Simon (2001), Theorem 1 states that the following
are equivalent:
(a) the formula f is generative,
(b)there is an uncentered cell C such that F (C) = Ck({f}), meaning that
there are uncountably many such cells, (equivalently uncountably many un-
centered cells dense in Ck({f})),
(c) Ck(f) = F (C) for some cell, but Ck(f) is not a maximal member of T ,
(d) there is a cell dense in Ck({f}) that is not finite.
We will call any member of Ωi an atom, or an atom of Ω
f
i if it also belongs
to Ωfi .
3 Uncountably many cells with uncountable
cardinality
Our first goal is to prove Theorem 1: If the formula f is generative then
there is a continuum of distinct cells dense in Ck({f}) such that there are in-
finitely many possibility sets with continuum cardinality. We prove Theorem
1 with something called the alienated extension. The alienated extension is
an alternation between different ways to extend an element of the finite level
structure Ωfi , with long stretches of least information extensions and long
stretches of confirming the finite models Ωfk for infinitely many k.
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If f is generative and i ≥ depth (f) define an F ∈ F
j
i (f) to be proto-
generative (for f) if there exists at least one v ∈ Ωfi−1 such that the number
of members of Ωfi in F∩πi◦π
−1
i−1(v) is at least 2; and define such an F ∈ F
j
i (f)
to be generative (for f) if for every v ∈ Ωfi−1 such that F∩πi◦π
−1
i−1(v) 6= ∅ then
the cardinality of this intersection is at least 2. Define an atom w ∈ Ωfi to
be proto-generative (respectively generative) for an agent j if it is contained
in a member of F
j
i (f) that is proto-generative (respectively generative).
If f is generative with depth d then there must be a proto-generative member
of F
j
d(f) for some j ∈ J , since otherwise all extensions from Ω
f
d to Ω
f
d+1 would
be determined uniquely, and the same would be true for all the following Ωfi
for all i > d, and we would have a contradiction to Theorem 1 of Simon
(2001).
Lemma 1: Let f be generative and let i ≥ d = depth (f).
(a) If F ∈ F
j
i (f) is proto-generative then every G ∈ F
k
i+1(f) with k 6= j and
π−1i+1(G) ∩ π
−1
i (F ) 6= ∅ is also proto-generative.
(b) Let F ∈ F
j
i (f) be given. If every G ∈ F
k
i (f) such that k 6= j and
G ∩ F 6= ∅ is proto-generative, then every F ′ ∈ F
j
i+1(f) extending F is
generative.
(c) If there are at least three agents then there is a level iˆ ≥ d such that for
all k ≥ iˆ all k-atoms of Ωfk are generative for all agents. If there are exactly
two agents, then there is a level iˆ ≥ d such that for all k ≥ iˆ any k-atom of
Ωfk is generative for either one or the other agent.
(d) There is a level iˆ such that for all k ≥ iˆ if F ′ ∈ F
j
k+2(f) was created
from the use of the least information extension twice from F ∈ F
l
k(f) and
B is in Gk with B ⊆ π
−1
k (F ) then the intersection F
′ ∩ πk+2(B) has at least
two elements.
(e) If there are only two agents and i is large enough so that all atoms
of Ωfi are generative for one or the other agent but none of them are pro-
generative for both agents then there must be one agent j such that all the
atoms of Ωfi ,Ω
f
i+2, . . . are generative for j, all the atoms of Ω
f
i+1,Ω
f
i+3, . . . are
generative for the other agent j′ 6= j, none of the atoms of Ωfi ,Ω
f
i+2, . . . are
proto-generative for j′, and none of the atoms of Ωfi+1,Ω
f
i+3, . . . are proto-
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generative for j.
Proof:
(a) Let F ′ ∈ F
j
i+1(f) be any extension of F intersecting G ∈ F
k
i+1(f), and let
B ∈ Gi(f) be any member such that π
−1
i+1(F
′)∩ π−1i+1(G)∩B 6= ∅. Since there
is at least two ways for Agent j to extend F that included the possibility of
πi(B) ∈ Ω
f
i (and because in extending πi(B) the agents choose their sets M
j
i
independently) we conclude that |G ∩ πi+1(B)| ≥ 2.
(b) Let B be any member of Gi(f) such that π
−1
i+1(F
′) ∩ B 6= ∅, and let
G ∈ F
k
i (f) be such that F ∩G contains πi(B). Because G is proto-generative
there must be at least two elements of Ωfi+1 in F
′ ∩ πi+1(B).
(c) If none of the atoms of Ωfd were proto-generative then there would be only
one way to extend all of these atoms to the next level, and so on ad infinitum,
and that would contradict the assumption that f is generative. Let v be a
atom of Ωfd that is not proto-generative of adjacency distance one from some
proto-generative atom w of Ωfd , with the two atoms sharing membership of
F ∈ F
j
d(f). Since there is only one extension of F to a member of F
j
d+1(f)
it must hold that every extension of v in Ωfd+1 remains adjacent to every
extension of w in Ωfd+1. Because w is proto-generative, and so for j
′ 6= j
the member of F j
′
d (f) containing v is proto-generative, it follows from Part
(a) that every extension of w is also proto-generative. By induction on the
adjacency distance it follows that if w ∈ Ωfd is of adjacency distance l from
a proto-generative v ∈ Ωfd then every extension of w in Ω
f
d+l is also proto-
generative. From the finiteness of the adjacency diameter of Ωfd there is an
l such that all atoms of Ωfd+l are proto-generative. Combining Parts (a) and
(b), if v ∈ Ωfi is proto-generative for agent j then any extension of v in Ω
f
i+1 is
proto-generative for the other agent, any extension of v in Ωfi+2 is generative
for agent j, any extension of v in Ωfi+3 is generative for the other agent, and
so on. The claim concerning more than two agents is now transparent.
(d) It follows directly from Parts (b) and (c).
(e) That for the first level iˆ there are generative atoms for only one agent fol-
lows from the connectedness of Ωf
iˆ
and induction on the adjacency distance.
The rest follows from Parts (b) and (c).
✷
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For any generative formula f ∈ L define gen (f) to be the first level i ≥ depth
(f) such that if there are two agents then every member of Ωfi is generative
for one or the other agent, and if there are at least three agents then all
members of Ωfi are generative for all agents.
For the rest of this section let a generative f ∈ L be fixed. Let 2N0∞ be the set
of subsets of the whole numbers N0 = {0, 1, 2, · · ·} with infinite cardinality
(S ∈ 2N0∞ implies S ⊆ N0 and |S| = ∞). For every pair i, k ∈ S with
k ≥ i ≥ depth (f) we will define a map pS,fk : Ω
f
i → Ω
f
k . If i ∈ S ∈ 2
N0
∞ define
nS(i) := inf {k ∈ S | k > i}, the first member of S strictly larger than i. If
i ∈ S and w ∈ Ωfi then define p
S,f
nS(i)
(w) := φ
Ωf
i
nS(i)
(w) and define pS,fi (w) := w.
pS,fnS(i)(w) is an extension of w, meaning that π
nS(i)
i (p
S,f
nS(i)
(w)) = w (Lemma
1 of Simon 2001). For every k ∈ S and w ∈ Ωfi with k ≥ i ∈ S and
pS,fk (w) ∈ Ω
f
k already defined, define p
S,f
nS(k)
(w) to be pS,fnS(k)(p
S,f
k (w)). Lastly,
for all i ∈ S ∈ 2N0∞ and w ∈ Ω
f
i define p
S,f : Ωfi → Ω
f by
pS,f(w) :=
⋂
l∈S, l>i
π−1l ◦ p
S,f
l (w).
For any i ∈ S ∈ 2N0∞ and w ∈ Ω
f
i we call p
S,f(w) the alienated extension of
w with respect to S and f . Define pS to be pS,f for any tautology f ∈ L.
An alienated extension involves an infinite number of least-information ex-
tensions. For all 0 ≤ i < ∞ and w ∈ Ωfi it is easy to confirm that
φ
Ωf
i
i+1(w) = p
f
i+1(w), meaning also that p
N0,f is the infinite repetition of the
least-information extension. Define the map pf to be pN0,f and p to be pN0 .
For any S ∈ 2N0∞ and positive k define n
k
S(i) by n
1
S(i) = nS(i) and n
k
S(i) =
nS ◦ n
k−1
S (i).
Lemma 2: If S ∈ 2N0∞ and f is generative, then all alienated extensions with
respect to S and f share the same dense cell of Ck({f}).
Proof: If i ≥ depth (f) and both w and w′ are members of Ωfi such that
both are contained in the same member of F
j
i (f), then from induction and
the definition of φΩ
f
i pS,f(w) and pS,f(w′) are both contained in the same
member of Qj , the limit of the F
j
i .
Now, given any i, k ∈ S and b ∈ Ωfi and d ∈ Ω
f
k , the adjacency distance
between pS,f(b) and pS,f(d) in Ωf is no more than the adjacency distance
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between pS,fmax(i,k)(b) and p
S,f
max(i,k)(d) in Ω
f
max(i,k). The rest follows by the con-
nectedness of Ωfi for every i ≥ depth (f). ✷
Given any generative formula f define the formula gfi := f(φ
Ωf
i
i+1(Ω
f
i )) of depth
i+1, the formula true in Ωfi+1 only in the image φ
Ωf
i
i+1(Ω
f
i ). As we will see, the
common knowledge of gfi is closely linked to the Kripke Structure Ω
f
i (see
also Theorem 4.23 of Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi 1991).
Lemma 3: The formula gfi is common knowledge in the Kripke Structure
Ωfi . If i ∈ S ∈ 2
N0
∞ , i ≥ depth (f), and i + 1, i + 2, . . . , i + l 6∈ S for some
l ≥ 1, then pS,f(Ωfi ) ⊆ α
Ωf (El(gfi )), and the same holds for φ
Ωf
i
i+l+1 applied to
any element of Ωfi .
Proof: Because Ωfi is finite and connected, φ
Ωf
i (Ωfi ) is a cell. Because
φΩ
f
i (Ωfi ) ⊆ α
Ωf (gfi ), Property (iv) and Lemma A imply that g
f
i is common
knowledge in the cell φΩ
f
i (Ωfi ). If E
l(gfi ), a formula of depth i + l + 1, were
not true at some point of φ
Ωf
i
i+l+1(Ω
f
i ) then also by Property (iv) we must have
that gfi is not common knowledge at some point of φ
Ωf
i (Ωfi ), a contradiction.
By Simon (2001) Ωfi and φ
Ωf
i (Ωfi ) are equivalent as Kripke Structures, so
that gfi is also common knowledge in the Kripke structure Ω
f
i . ✷
Lemma 4: If f is generative and i ≥ gen (f) then Egfi is not true at any
extension of pfi+2(Ω
f
i+1).
Proof: Because φ
Ωf
i+1
i+2 (w) = p
f
i+2(w) for any w ∈ Ω
f
i+1, given w ∈ Ω
f
i+1 it
suffices to find some j ∈ J such that kj(g
f
i ) is not true at p
f
i+2(w). Let j ∈ J
be such that w ∈ Ωfi+1 is generative for Agent j and let w be in F ∈ F
j
i+1(f).
For every v ∈ Ωfi there is only one member of Ω
f
i+1 in the subset πi+1(π
−1
i (v))
where gfi is true. But for v := π
i+1
i (w) ∈ Ω
f
i there are at least two u ∈ Ω
f
i+1
with u ∈ F ∩ πi+1(π
−1
i (v)) (including at least the possibility of u = w). The
F ′ ∈ F
j
i+2(f) containing p
f
i+2(w) must have a non-empty intersection with
πi−2 ◦ π
−1
i+1(u) for all u ∈ F ∩ Ω
f
i+1, and therefore F
′ is not contained in
αΩ
f
i+2(gfi ). ✷
Proof of Theorem 1: Define a map β : 2N0 → 2N0∞ by
β(S) := {0, 1, 2, 4, 8, · · ·} ∪ {2i + 1, · · · , 2i+1 − 1 | i ∈ S}.
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Define an equivalence relation on 2N0 by S ∼ T if and only if there exists an
m ∈ N0 such that S\{0, 1, 2, · · ·m} = T\{0, 1, 2, · · · , m}. The co-sets of this
equivalence relation have the cardinality of the continuum.
Let k be such that 2k ≥ gen (f) and let d = 2k. Due to Lemma 2, it suffices
to show for some w ∈ Ωfd that if S and T are both subsets of N0 with
S 6∼ T then pβ(S),f(w) does not share the same cell as pβ(T ),f(w). For the
sake of contradiction, let us suppose that the adjacency distance in Ck({f})
between pβ(S),f(w) and pβ(T ),f (w) equals a finite number l < ∞. Because
S 6∼ T there exists an i > max(log2((l + 2)), k) such that i ∈ S and i 6∈ T ,
or vice versa. By symmetry, let us assume that i ∈ S and i 6∈ T . Lemma
3 applied to pβ(T ),f (w) implies that pβ(T ),f(w) ∈ αΩ
f
(El+1gf2i). But because
the adjacency-distance between pβ(S),f(w) and pβ(T ),f (w) is l we have that
pβ(S),f(w) ∈ αΩ
f
(E(gf2i)), a contradiction to Lemma 4.
If S is infinite (all but one of the uncountably many equivalent relations)
then any possibility sets containing an alienated extension is homeomorphic
to a Cantor set. This follows from Lemma 1d and the fact that for every
such S there are arbitrarily long strings of the least information extension
applied. ✷
Because there are only countably many alienated extensions pβ(S),f(w) for any
fixed S (because there are only countably many atoms w on any level) we
haven’t shown that there are uncountably many cells where all the possibility
sets are equivalent to Cantor sets. That would be a more difficult claim to
prove and would require a better understanding of what happens at any finite
adjacency distance from a point created by an alienated extension. We leave
it as an open question:
Question 5: For any generative formula f does there exist uncountably
many cells dense in Ck({f}) where all the possibility sets are equivalent to
Cantor sets?
Corollary 1: If f is generative and C is a cell of finite fanout where f
generates all the formulas held in common knowledge then there cannot be
a uniform bound on the size of the possibility sets in C.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that n is a uniform bound on the size of
the possibility sets in C. Let F be any possibility set topologically equivalent
to a Cantor set in a cell C ′ that is also dense in Ck({f}) and let z be any
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point of F . Let j be the agent such that F is a possibility set for j. Because
F is infinite, there will be n + 1 mutually exclusive formulas g0, . . . , gn such
that ¬kj¬gi is true at z for every choice of i = 0, . . . n (¬kj¬gi meaning
that j considers the validity of gi to be possible). Because C is also dense
in Ck({f}) there will be a sequence z1, z2, . . . of points in C converging to
z. At some level L all the ¬kj¬gi will be valid at all zl for all l ≥ L and
0 ≤ i ≤ n. Because the gi are mutually exclusive the possibility set for
agent j containing any such point zl will have cardinality at least n + 1, a
contradiction.
4 Finite Fanout
Now we construct uncountably many cells of finite fanout dense in Ck({f})
for any generative f ∈ L. Let such an f be fixed for the rest of this section.
The proof of Theorem 2 is quite different from that of Theorem 1. Again we
alternate how extensions are performed, but much more toward confirming
finite models and also selectively within any stage, so that some points of Ωfi
can be extended by way of the least information extension and other points
of Ωfi according to a previous finite model.
For any w ∈ Ωfi define F
j
i (w) to be that member of F
j
i (f) containing w.
From Proposition 2 of Simon (1999), with finitely many agents a cell is
compact if and only if it has finite diameter. Therefore by Theorem 1 of
Simon (2001) all cells dense in Ck({f}) do not have finite diameter, and this
implies also that there is no bound on the diameters of the Ωfi .
Let S ∈ 2N0∞ satisfy
1) inf S > gen (f) + 8,
2) for every i ∈ S the differences nS(i) − i (the next member of S after i
minus i) start at at least 5 and are strictly increasing,
3) for every i ∈ S the adjacency diameter of ΩfnS(i) is strictly greater than
twice the size of the set {k ∈ S | k ≤ i} plus 3, and
4) 2(ns(i)−i−1)/2 is strictly greater than the cardinality of Ωfi .
Let T be any infinite subset of S with inf T = inf S. For every such T and
i ≥ inf T we define inductively two subsets Ai and Bi of Ω
f
i . If there are
only two agents and the levels beyond gen (f) + 2 alternate between being
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all generative for one agent and not proto-generative for the other agent
(Lemma 1e) then define w0 to be any element of p
f
inf T (Ω
f
gen(f)+2). If there
is an atom v of Ωfgen(f)+2 that is generative for both agents then let w0 be
pfinfT (v), in either case w0 is an application of the least information extension
from level gen(f) + 2 to the level inf T . Define Binf T to be the singleton
{w0} and Ainf T = ∅. We assume that Ak and Bk have been defined for all
inf T ≤ k < i, and show how to define Ai and Bi. First, we define a extension
function γi : Ai−1∪Bi−1 → Ai∪Bi for all i > inf T ; it suffices to determine the
sets M ji−1(γi(w)). If w ∈ Ai−1 then M
j
i−1(γi(w)) := (Ai−1 ∪ Bi−1) ∩ F
j
i−1(w).
If w ∈ Bi−1 and F
j
i−1(w) contains some member of Ai−1, thenM
j
i−1(γi(w)) :=
(Ai−1∪Bi−1)∩F
j
i−1(w); otherwise if Ai−1∩F
j
i−1(w) = ∅, thenM
j
i−1(γi(w)) :=
F ji−1(w). If i ∈ T we define Bi to be the set {p
f
i (w) | w ∈ Ω
f
i−1\(Ai−1∪Bi−1),
w ∈ F ji−1(b) for some b ∈ Bi−1 and j ∈ J with F
j
i−1(b) ∩ Ai−1 = ∅} and we
define Ai to be the set γi(Ai−1 ∪ Bi−1). If i 6∈ T we define Bi to be the set
γi(Bi−1). and we define Ai to be the set γi(Ai−1). For any i > inf T , l ≥ 0,
and w ∈ Ai−1 ∪ Bi−1 we define γi+l(w) = γi+l ◦ . . . ◦ γi(w) and we define
γ(w) := ∩∞k=iπ
−1
k γk(w). We define C to be {γ(w) | i ≥ inf T, w ∈ Ai}.
If there are only two agents, notice from Lemma 1 that any atom of Ωfi with
i ≥ inf S and within an adjacency distance of 3 from Bi is either generative
for both agents or it is generative for one agent and not proto-generative
for the other agent – and the same holds for all extensions of this atom to
higher levels. It would be nice, if possible, to prove that if any atom of
Ωfgen(f)+2 is generative for both agents then there is a level for which all
atoms are generative for both agents. Such an argument was easy for non
proto-generation for both agents, since the extensions of such atoms were
determined and not “running away”. However proto-generation with one
but not the other agent still allows for distinct extensions of the same atom
to gain distance from each other. The question is whether they can do so
fast enough to avoid mutual generation.
Lemma 5 : The extension function γi is well defined for every i ≥ inf T and
if b ∈ Bi is adjacent in Ω
f
i to a ∈ Ai, sharing the same member of F
j
i (f),
and k is the largest member of T less than or equal to i, then a = γi(b
′) for
some b′ ∈ Bk−1 with F
j
k−1(b
′) ∩ Ak−1 = ∅.
Proof: We prove both claims together by induction on i. γinf T+1(w0) =
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pfinf T+1(w0) is well defined. We assume that γk is well defined for all inf T +
1 ≤ k < i. Let w ∈ Ai−1 ∪ Bi−1, and for any given j ∈ J let us assume
that v ∈ Ωfi−2 satisfies π
−1
i−2(v) ∩ π
−1
i−1(F
j
i−1(w)) 6= ∅. We need to show that
πi−1(π
−1
i−2(v)) ∩M
j
i−1(γi(w)) 6= ∅. If i − 1 6∈ T and i > inf T then the well
definition of γi−1 shows the same for γi, so for the following cases, we assume
that i− 1 ∈ T .
Case 1; w ∈ Ai−1 and v ∈ Ai−2 ∪Bi−2: γi−1(v) is in F
j
i−1(w) because v and
πi−1i−2(w) share the same member of F
j
i−2(f).
Case 2; w ∈ Ai−1 and v 6∈ Ai−2 ∪ Bi−2: This is possible only if π
i−1
i−2(w) ∈
Bi−2 and F
j
i−2(π
i−1
i−2(w))∩Ai−2 = ∅. Since v ∈ F
j
i−2(π
i−1
i−2(w)) we have p
f
i−1(v) ∈
Bi−1 ∩ F
j
i−1(w).
Case 3; w ∈ Bi−1 and F
j
i−1(w)∩Ai−1 6= ∅: Let a ∈ F
j
i−1(w)∩Ai−1. By the
second part of the induction hypothesis πi−1i−2(a) ∈ Bi−2 with F
j
i−2(π
i−1
i−2(a)) ∩
Ai−2 = ∅. It follows that v is in F
j
i−2(π
i−1
i−2(a)) and whether or not v was in
Bi that there is an extension of v in Ai−1 ∪ Bi−1.
Case 4; w ∈ Bi−1 and F
j
i−1(w) ∩ Ai−1 = ∅: Since w ∈ p
f
i−1(Ω
f
i−2) we have
that pfi−1(v) ∈ F
j
i−1(w).
For the second part of the claim, suppose for the sake of contradiction
that b′ := πik−1(a) ∈ Ak−1. b
′ shares the same member of F
j
k−1(f) with
c := πik−1(b) ∈ Ω
f
k−1\(Ak−1 ∪ Bk−1). For every j ∈ J and D ∈ Gk−2(f)
if π−1k (F
j
k (γk(b
′))) intersects D then it intersects D in only one member
of Gk−1(f). If b
′ is generative for j then by Lemma 1 it is different from
π−1k (F
j
k (p
f
k(c))) = π
−1
k (F
j
k (π
i
ki(b))), a contradiction. If there are only two
agents and b′ is not generative for j then by the well definition of γk−1 c must
have been in Ak−1 ∪ Bk−1, also a contradiction. So we conclude that b
′ was
in Bk−1. Furthermore, if F
j
k−1(b
′) ∩ Ak−1 6= ∅ then either π
i
k(a) and π
i
k(b)
would not share the same member of F
j
k(f) (the case of F
j
k−1(b
′) generative)
or from the well definition of γk π
i
k−1(b) would be in Ak−1 ∪ Bk−1 (the case
of F jk−1(b
′) not generative), both contradictions. ✷
The second part of Lemma 5 shows that if i ∈ T , b ∈ Bi−1 and γi(b) = a ∈ Ai
then for every k ≥ 1 the only members of Ank
T
(i)∪Bnk
T
(i) adjacent to γnk
T
(i)(a)
are already in the set γnk
T
(i)(Ai ∪ Bi) ⊆ Ank
T
(i). Therefore C = {γ(w) | i ≥
inf T, w ∈ Ai} is a cell with finite fanout.
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Lemma 6: If w and w′ are in Ωfi for some i ≥ inf T but neither are in Bi
then there is an adjacency path w = w0, w1, . . . , wq = w
′ in Ωfi between w
and w′ such that wm 6∈ Bi for all 1 ≤ m ≤ q − 1.
Proof: We proceed by induction on i. Consider an adjacency path v1, v2, . . . , vl
in Ωfi−1 with v1 = π
i
i−1(w) and vl = π
i
i−1(w
′). We assume that vk and
vk+1 share the same member F
jk
i−1 of F
jk
i−1(f) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ l − 1, and
that jk 6= jk+1 for every consecutive pair k, k + 1. We will define an ex-
tension wk ∈ Ω
f
i of vk for every k such that M
jk
i−1(wk) = M
jk
i−1(wk+1) is a
subset F jkk ∈ F
jk
i−1(f) containing both vk and vk+1 with a non-empty inter-
section with πi−1(D) for every D ∈ Gi−2(f) with π
−1
i−1(F
jk
k ) ∩ D 6= ∅ and
M ji−1(w1) = M
j
i−1(w) for at least one j 6= j1 and M
j
i−1(wl) = M
j
i−1(w
′) for
at least one j 6= jl−1. The path w,w1, . . . , wl, w
′ will be an adjacency path
connecting w and w′, allowing possibly for the identity of w and w1 or of
w′ and wl. We must show that these extensions can be done so that for all
1 < k < l no extension wk is in Bi.
Case 1; there are at least three agents: Looking at any vk, let j ∈ J
be any agent other than jk or jk−1. Since all levels involved are generative
for all agents and the choice of M ji−1(wk) doesn’t affect the connectivity, the
selection of M ji−1(wk) can be made so that wk is not a least information
extension and therefore not in Bi.
Case 2; there are only two agents (J = {1, 2}) and i 6∈ T : By i 6∈ T the
only members of Bi are extensions of members of Bi−1. Since all members of
Bi−1 are adjacent to members of Ai−1, by the induction assumption we can
assume that at most v1 and vl are in Bi−1. So if v1 and vl are not in Bi−1,
we are done by induction on the stages. Without loss of generality assume
for now that v1 = π
i
i−1(w) is in Bi−1. Let m be the largest member of T
that is less than i. If m is greater than inf T = inf S we know from Lemma
5 that there is a jˆ ∈ {1, 2} such that v1 is a member of Bi−1 and π
i−1
m−1(v1)
shared the same member of F
jˆ
m−1(f) with a b ∈ Bm−1 but with no member
of Am−1. In this case define b
′ = γi−2(b) (with b
′ = b if m = i−1). Otherwise
let b′ be any other member of Ωfi−2 that shares a member of F
jˆ
i−2(f) with
πii−2(v) (for which there must be several since w0 was created from several
applications of the non-information extension). Because π−1i−1(F
jˆ
i−1(v1)) ∩
π−1i−2(b
′) 6= ∅ it follows that F jˆi (w) contains some extension u ∈ Ω
f
i of this b
′,
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and furthermore no member of either Bi or Bi−1 is an extension of this b
′.
Therefore, since w and u are adjacent, we can replace w by u 6∈ Bi, do the
same for w′ if necessary, and repeat with the induction assumption with the
added assumption that none of the vk are in Bi−1.
Case 3; there are only two agents (J = {1, 2}) and i ∈ T : All members
of Bi are created as extensions of points not in Bi−1 ∪ Ai−1 and they are
all in pfi (Ω
f
i−1). If possible, for every k let M
jk
i−1(wk) = M
jk
i−1(wk+1) be any
proper subset of F jkk (vk) containing both vk and vk+1, meaning that if this
is possible then we keep both wk and wk+1 out of Bi. On the other hand, if
M ji−1(wk) = F
j
k (vk) is forced for both agents j then we will show that the so
defined wk is also not in Bi.
Case 3a; and 1 < k < l: Either vk is generative for Agent 1 or Agent 2.
Without loss of generality assume that vk is generative for Agent 1, with
F = F 1i−1(vk) ∈ F
1
i−1(f) connecting vk to v
∗, equal to either vk−1 or vk+1.
Because F is generative, if there were only way to define M1i−1(vk) so as to
include both vk and v
∗ it must follow that F 1i−1(vk) = {vk, v
∗} with both
vk and v
∗ extensions of the same u ∈ Ωfi−2 (with v
∗ = vk+1 if jk = 1 and
v∗ = vk−1 if jk = 2). Looking at what is necessary for wk to be in Bi, since F
projected to the i−2 level contains only one element and either the previous
number in T is below the i− 4 level or i = inf T and w0 was created through
several applications of the least information extension, it is also necessary
for there to be some u′ ∈ F 2i−2(u) other than u (with the possible choice of
u′ ∈ Bi−2 if i > inf T ; there will be many more than one other member of
F 2i−2(u), but one other suffices for the argument). If vk were generative for
Agent 2 we would be able to avoid wk in Bi from the choice of M
2
i−1(vk). So
we have to assume that vk is not generative for Agent 2 and therefore from
Lemma 1 that F 2i−2(u) is generative. Let H be π
−1
i−3 ◦π
i−2
i−3(u
′). There must be
at least three members of F corresponding to the three non-empty subsets
of πi−2(H) ∩ Ω
f
i−2 combined with u, a contradiction to our assumption that
F = F 1i−1(vk) contained only two elements. Therefore there was more than
one way to connect our extensions of vk and v
∗, one of those ways avoiding
membership of wk in Bi.
Case 3b; l > 1 and k = 1 or k = l): Without loss of generality we
assume that F ∈ F
1
i−1(f) contains both v1 and v2. As with Case 3a, if v1
were generative for Agent 1 there would be no alternative to M1i−1(v1) =
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{v1, v2} only if there were only two elements of π
i−1
i−2(F ). As with Case 3a,
the generative property of πi−1i−2(v1) for Agent 2 and either the adjacency to
Bi−2 through agent 2 or the definition of w0 results in a contradiction. On
the other hand, if v1 is not generative for Agent 1, by the fact that it is also
not proto-generative for Agent 1 (by proximity to Bi−1 and the definition of
w0) w1 would be equal to w, which we assumed to be not in Bi.
Case 3c; l = 1, meaning that w and w′ are extensions of the same
v ∈ Ωfi−1 : If v were not proto-generative for some agent then w and w
′ would
already be adjacent. Now assuming that v is generative for both agents, the
only way for an extension w∗ of v to belong to Bi would be if M
j
i−1(w
∗) =
F ji−1(v) ∈ F
j
i−1(f) for both j = 1, 2, and either F
1
i−1(v) or F
2
i−1(v) contained a
member ofBi−1 and no member of Ai−1. If either F
1
i−1(v) or F
2
i−1(v) contained
a member of Bi−1 and no member of Ai−1, then by w and w
′ both not in
Bi it must hold that M
j
i−1(w) 6= F
j
i−1(v) for some j and M
j′
i−1(w
′) 6= F j
′
i−1(v)
for some j′. If M ji−1(w) = F
j
i−1(v) and M
j
i−1(w
′) = F ji−1(v) for the same j
then w and w′ were already adjacent. Otherwise if j can be different from
j′ define w∗ ∈ Ωfi by M
j
i−1(w
∗) = M ji−1(w) and M
j′
i−1(w
∗) = M j
′
i−1(w
′) and it
follows that w∗ will connect w and w′ without being in Bi. ✷
Lemma 6 implies that the removal of Bi does not disconnect Ω
f
i . As we will
see, it does not matter that perhaps Ωfi \Bi may be connected through Ai.
Due to Lemma 1d and Property 4 defining the set S, at every level i the
set Bi will vastly outnumber the set Ai. More importantly, the extensions
in Ai+1, Ai+2, . . . of a member of Ai do not involve the least information
extensions. Notice that every member of Bi (except for i = inf T ) is by
definition connected to some member of Ai.
Lemma 7: If i ∈ T and the shortest adjacency paths within Ωfi \Bi between
w ∈ Ωfi \π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) and π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) ⊆ Ω
f
i are of length k ≥ 1, then there
is an 1 ≤ l ≤ k with pf
nl+1
T
(i)
(w) ∈ Bnl+1
T
(i).
Proof: We proceed by induction on k. If k = 1, let c ∈ π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) be
adjacent to w 6∈ π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) and let j be the agent such that w and c share
the same member of F
j
i (f). The atom p
f
nT (i)
(c) ∈ BnT (i) can not share the
same member of F
j
nT (i)
(f) with a member of AnT (i), since by Lemma 5 the
element c would have shared the same member of F
j
i (f) with a member of
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Bi and therefore p
f
nT (i)
(w) would also be a member of BnT (i), a contradiction
to k = 1. By the definition of Bn2
T
(i) it follows that p
f
n2
T
(i)
(w) is in Bn2
T
(i).
Assume the claim is true for k − 1 ≥ 1. Let v ∈ Ωfi be the next element
after c in one of the shortest adjacency paths within Ωfi \Bi from some
c ∈ π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) to w. Let v share with c a member of F
j
i (f). By the
argument above we have that pf
n2
T
(i)
(v) ∈ Bn2
T
(i) and also p
f
nT (i)
(v) 6∈ BnT (i)
and pfnT (i)(u) 6∈ BnT (i) for all u ∈ Ω
f
i in this adjacency path from v to w,
including u = w (due to the minimality of the path). Therefore we have an
adjacency path of length k−1 within ΩfnT (i)\BnT (i) between p
f
nT (i)
(v) ∈ πnT (i)◦
π−1
n2
T
(i)
(Bn2
T
(i)) and p
f
nT (i)
(w). Whether or not it is one of the shortest adjacency
paths of this kind we have our conclusion by the induction hypothesis. ✷
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 show that no member v of Ωfi can be trapped by the
formation of the Bi, meaning that is impossible for v to belong to πi(BnT (i))
without pfnT (i)(v) ∈ BnT (i) generating some members of Bn2T (i). This is critical
to the proof of the next lemma.
Lemma 8: The cell C = {γ(a) | i ∈ T, a ∈ Ai} is dense in Ck({f}).
Proof: Density of the cell will follow because by choosing any level i ∈ T and
any w ∈ Ωfi we will show that there is some level iˆ ≥ i with a member of Aiˆ
extending w. By Lemma 7 and the fact that Bi does not disconnect Ω
f
i \Bi
(Lemma 6), we need to show that π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) is not empty for every i ∈ T .
We establish this by induction on i ∈ T . The set Binf T = {w0} is not empty.
Assume the claim is true for any particular i ∈ T and all those members of
T before i. By Lemma 7 all elements of Bi ∪ (π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i))) are within an
adjacency distance of m := |T ∩{1, 2, . . . , i}| from γi(w0), yet the diameter of
Ωfi is at least 2m+1 by the definition of S; this means that both π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i))
and Ωfi \π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) are not empty. Also by Lemma 7, the non-emptiness
of π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) and the existence of some w ∈ Ω
f
i \π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) that is of
positive but finite adjacency distance from π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) implies the non-
emptiness of π
n2
T
(i)
nT (i)
(Bn2
T
(i)) ⊆ Ω
f
nT (i)
. Density now follows by Lemma 7 and
the connectivity of all the Ωfi . ✷
Theorem 2: If the formula f is generative then there is a continuum of cells
with finite fanout that are dense in Ck({f}).
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Proof: Let C be a cell created from a subset T ⊆ S with inf T = inf S.
Every possibility set of C is created from a least information extension from
some level i ∈ T applied repetitively to a member of π
nT (i)
i (BnT (i)) (sharing
its possibility set in Ωfi with a member of Bi) up to the stage nT (i), followed
by a limiting of its size according to membership in some possibility set of
ΩfnT (i). Due to Property 4 defining S and Lemma 1d, we can read off the
subset T from the sizes of the possibility sets in C. As there are uncountably
many infinite subsets T of S with inf T = inf S, the theorem is proven. ✷
5 Infinite generation and infinite fanout
Let us review the possibilities for cells of finite fanout. All finite cells are
defined by the common knowledge of a single formula (Fagin, Halpern, and
Vardi 1991). Combined with results from Simon (1999, 2001) if a cell C has
finite fanout it can come in only one of four forms:
1) C is finite, F (C) is finitely generated and maximal in T ,
2) C is infinite, F (C) is finitely generated and not maximal in T , and C is
uncentered,
3) C is infinite, F (C) is infinitely generated and not maximal in T , and C
is centered.
4) C is infinite, F (C) is infinitely generated, and C is uncentered.
Within Case 4, F (C) may or may not be maximal, as with the Bernoulli
shift space examples presented above. How can one distinguish Case 3 from
the others? A countable cell is centered if and only if it contains at least one
isolated point, (Simon 1999), a straightforward application of Baire Category.
Difficult to distinguish is Case 2 from Case 4, the distinction being that of
finite vs infinite generation.
How wild can things be if finite fanout does not hold? Until now, this paper
has been concerned with the existence and properties of uncountably many
cells that share the same set of formulas in common knowledge. This is qual-
itatively different from that of uncountably many distinct Kripke Structure
that map injectively to mutually distinct subsets of the same cell of Ω. These
issues are different because every possibility set of a cell is a compact set, a
property not assumed of the image of a semantic model that maps injectively
to Ω. This distinction comes into sharp contrast when considering the finite
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fanout property. A cell of finite fanout has the surjective property, meaning
that all Kripke Structure that map to it must map to it surjectively. A non-
surjective cell may offer many possibilities for disconnected Kripke Structure
to map to some cell, but neither this cell nor these Kripke Structure can
have finite fanout. This is because the image of a possibility set of a multi-
partition with evaluation in Ω must be a dense subset of a possibility set of
Ω (Lemma 5, Simon 1999).
We present a cell that is centered and compact, meaning also by Proposi-
tion 2 of Simon (1999) that it has finite adjacency diameter, and yet there
is a Kripke Structure with uncountably many connected components that
maps injectively to this cell. Furthermore, the corresponding set of formulas
cannot be finitely generated, since the compactness of the cell C implies the
maximality of these formulas in T and by Theorem 1 of Simon (2001) this
would imply that this cell must be finite.
To explain our claim, we must first describe Example 3 presented in Simon
(2001). This was an example of a compact cell homeomorphic to a Cantor
set with an adjacency radius of 2. To construct this example we let Ω be
Ω(X, {1, 2}) and defined a sequence of partitions in the following way:
for every 0 < i < ∞ define Ai = {pi(w) | w ∈ Ωi−1}. Define P0 = {Ω}
and Pi = Pi−1 ∨ {π
−1
i (Ai) , Ω\π
−1
i (Ai)}. We labelled the partitions by
B = (Pi | 0 ≤ i <∞) and we defined a Kripke Structure
K(B) = (Ω; (Qj | j ∈ {1, 2}),P∞;X ;ψ)
where the partition P∞ for the third agent is the limit of the partitions Pi,
(meaning that z and z′ share the same member of P∞ if and only if they
share the same member of Pi for every i < ∞), with ψ and the Q
j for
j = 1, 2 the same used to define the Kripke Structure Ω. The third agent can
distinguish two points if and only if the no-information extension was applied
on different stages. We showed (Simon 2001) that the set φK(B)(Ω) is a cell
of Ω(X, {1, 2, 3}) equivalent as a semantic model to K(B), and furthermore
that the map φK(B) is a homeomorphism between Ω = Ω(X, {1, 2}) and the
cell that is its image.
Define A := {pS(w) | S ∈ 2N0∞ , i ∈ S, w ∈ Ωi} ⊆ Ω = Ω(X, {1, 2}), the
set of all alienated extensions with respect to the tautologies. Define B :=
φK(B)(A), the image of the set A in Ω(X, {1, 2, 3}). We will show that B
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defines a Kripke Structure with uncountably many connected components.
To show this, we need some additional results from Simon (1999).
We define a subset A ⊆ Ω to be good if for every j ∈ J and every F ∈ Qj
satisfying F ∩ A 6= ∅ it follows that F ∩ A is dense in F . By Lemma 5
and Lemma 6 of Simon (1999) A is good if and only if for every z ∈ A
φV(A)(z) = z (where the Kripke structure V(A) is defined above).
First we show that B is a good subset. Let z = pS(w) ∈ Ω for some i ∈
S ∈ 2N0∞ and w ∈ Ωi. Let j ∈ {1, 2}, z ∈ F ∈ Q
j = Qj(X, {1, 2}), and
F ∩ π−1k (v) 6= ∅ for some v ∈ Ωk with k ∈ S and k ≥ i. Since v shares
the same member of F
j
k with πk(z) we have that p
S(v) ∈ F . Otherwise let
z ∈ P ∈ P∞ and let P ∩ π
−1
k (v) 6= ∅ for some v ∈ Ωk with k ∈ S and
k ≥ i. Likewise pS(v) is in P , since π−1k (v) shares the same member of Pk
with z = pS(πk(z)). By the above mentioned homeomorphism B is a good
subset.
Fix w0 ∈ Ω0. Next we assume that the adjacency distance between p
S(w0)
and pT (w0) within the Kripke Structure V
K(B)(A) is l < ∞ for some pair
S, T ∈ 2N0∞ with S and T both containing {0}. Let p
S(w0) = z0, z1, . . . , zl =
pT (w0) be a path of members of A such that for every 0 ≤ k ≤ l− 1 zk and
zk+1 share the same member of Q
1, Q2, or P∞, and for every 0 ≤ k ≤ l
zk = p
Sk(vk) for Sk ∈ 2
N0
∞ for all k, vk ∈ Ωnk and nk ∈ Sk (with S0 = S,
Sl = T , n0 = nl = 0, and v0 = vl = w0.) Let N = max0≤k≤l(nk). If zk
and zk+1 share the same member of P∞ then by the definition of Pi we have
that Sk\{0, 1, . . . , N −1} = Sk+1\{0, 1, . . . , N −1}. Now assume that zk and
zk+1 share the same member of Q
1, (respectively Q2.) If i ≥ max(nk, nk+1)
it is not possible for i to be in N0\Sk without i being in N0\Sk+1 (and vice
versa). If such an i ∈ N0\Sk were in Sk+1 then πi+1 ◦ p
Sk+1(vk+1) would
be a no-information extension and therefore πi+1 ◦ p
Sk(vk) could not share
the same member of F
1
i+1 with it, given that i 6∈ Sk. (We use that all
members of Ωi for all i ≥ 0 are generative for both agents.) That suffices
for Sk\{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} = Sk+1\{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} for all k and therefore
that S\{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} = T\{0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. With ∼ defined on 2N0∞ as
before, we see that S 6∼ T implies that pS(w) and pT (w) cannot have a finite
adjacency distance in the Kripke Structure VK(B)(A).
The above argument that S\{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} = T\{0, 1, . . . , N − 1} works
only because all the points concerned are alienated extensions. With respect
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to the whole space Ω the Kripke Structure K(B) is connected and has an
adjacency radius of 2 (see Simon 2001), meaning that there is a point such
that all other points can be reached from this point by adjacency paths of
length 2 or less!
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